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Non-technical summary
Patents and the expenditures on research and development (R&D) are the most widely used indicators in the economic analysis of technical change. Both indicators are used to assess the technological strength of countries or sectors as a whole or with respect to certain areas of technology. The continual development of these indicators commonly interpreted towards changes of the innovative capabilities. At the firm level patent numbers and R&D are used as indicators of the technological capabilities of firms to assess the productivity effects of innovations or the technological strategies of firms. Although many studies use this indicators more or less as substitutes, the relationship between R&D expenditure and patents was the subject only of a few studies. It is well-known that both indicators have strengths and weaknesses. R&D expenditure suffers from the under-counting of R&D in small firms. Not all inventions were protected by patents, either because patents are a weak instrument to protect intellectual property or because patents not only protect but also diffuse knowledge to competitors. R&D expenditures represent the most important input into the innovation process whereas a patent is an (intermediate) result of an innovation process. Therefore, it is questionable whether there is a close correlation between patent numbers and R&D expenditures.
Based on the data of the Mannheim Innovation panel this paper explores the relationship between R&D expenditures and patents at the firm level. It is shown that --the share of R&D performing firms is strictly increasing with firm size. The share of firms applying for patents exhibits an even steeper increase with firm size. Moreover, large firms more likely apply for patents in more than one country. In comparison to the patent applications at the European Patent Office or other international patent offices, the German patent system seems to be especially important to small and medium sized enterprises.
The number of patent applications depends on firm's own R&D expenditure but does not depend on R&D spent by competitors. Our study implies that the ability of R&D to generate patents is increasing with the amount spent on R&D. Even when we take into account a variety of firm characteristics as well as R&D expenditure the number of patent applications is increasing with firm size. The same is true with respect to the propability that a firm applies for a patent. This result can be explained by a lack of information on the patent system by small firms. Alternatively small firms prefer other mechanisms (e.g. secrecy) to protect their innovation or distrust' patents, maybe because of the large costs involved in defending a patent. Another explanation of this result would be that small firmson average -are more engaged in incremental innovation which does not fulfill the novelty requirement of patents. Moreover, large firms more probably apply for patent due to institutional requirements (e.g. Arbeitnehmererfinderrecht). In addition, firms apply for patents because patents are used in cross-licencing agreements with other firms.
Introduction
Patents and R&D are commonly used indicators in the economic analysis of technical change (see e. g. Griliches 1990 , Pavitt 1985 . At the aggregate level both measures are used to assess the technological strength of countries and industries. The continual development of these indicators is commonly interpreted towards changes of the innovative capabilities (e.g. NIW et al. 1996 , National Science Board 1996 . In firm level analyses, patent numbers and R&D are used as indicators of the technological capacity of firms to study productivity effects of innovation (e.g. Lach 1995) or to test the famous Schumpeterian hypothesis (see Cohen and Levin 1989) .
The usage of patent information and R&D figures as economic indicators has been steadily improved and refined in recent years. The quality of both indicators as well as the availability of this kind of data has increased and measurement standards were developed (see e.g. OECD 1993 OECD , 1994 . Now, computerisation of patent offices -enables detailed analyses of patent information. R&D surveys are performed on a regular basis in all developed economies. Therefore,' it seems worthwhile to look more closely at the relationship between both indicators at the firm level.
It has often been recognised that R&D and patents capture different aspects of the innovation. process. R&D expenditures or the number of R&D employees can be viewed as a measure of the resources devoted to the innovation process. But R&D represents only a part of the resources necessary to launch new products and processes. In addition, traditional R&D surveys often fail to uncover R&D in small firms (see e.g. Kleinknecht and van Reijhen 1991) . On the other hand patents reflect the results of innovation processes. But as for R&D, only a part of the innovation output is captured by patents. Patents reflect just one aspect: the means by which firms protect an innovation. However, patenting is only one method to protect profits originating from new products or processes from imitati9n by potential competitors (see for the US, Konig and Licht 1995 for Germany) . Moreover, computerisation of patent offices decreased the costs of inferring technological information from patent documents held by competitors in recent years. As a consequence the value of patent protection decreases. As shown by Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski (1985) it is rationale not to patent all inventions if patent applic~tions contain information on technological opportunities.
The relationship between patents and R&D has been studied by various authors in recent years. Pavitt (1985) concludes that small firms tend to patent more per unit R&D than large firms. Scherer (1983) finds remarkable differences in patenting behaviour within technology groups not being explained by R&D efforts. Using a data set of large German companies, Zimmermann und Schwalbach (1991) find only weak correlations between various firm characteristics like risk, diversification, export share and patenting behaviour. In the absence of R&D data, firm size turns out to be an important determinant of the number of patents held by a company. Evenson (1993) stresses the importance of foreign demand for the propensity to patent. Duguet (1996, 1997) study the relation of R&D and patent application at the firm level using a sample of French firms. Using a wide variety of count data models, they find a R&D elasticity of patent numbers of just around 1 and a strong negative effect of R&D rivalry on patent activity.
Our study builds on this literature to explore the relationship between patents and R&D. It extends the previous literature in at least four aspects. First, previous literature is mainly based on data of US or French enterprises. Our study supplements the literature with the case of the West-Germany economy which is the world's third largest patentee. Second, we study patent applications at various patent offices for a large sample of manufacturing firms, which enable us to compare patenting behaviour in the home and the export market. Existing empirical evidence only looks at one patent office. Our data set provides us with information on patent applications at various patent offices which allows us to draw some inferences with regard to national and international patenting activities. Third, our data enables us to control for the effect of certain firm characteristics unavailable in most studies. Finally, we distinguish between the decision with respect to the first patent and the decision for additional patents. We carefully test the statistical properties of various count data models and adopt a negative binomial hurdle model to take account for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the propensity to patent as well as the ability of firms to generate inventions.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the problem by describing patenting behaviour and R&D at the firm level. It gives some evidence on differences of patenting and not patenting firms as depicted by indicators of innovation processes. Section 3 shortly outlines a theoretical framework for investigating the relation of R&D and patents at the firm level. In section 4 we describe the necessary steps to implement the theoretical framework to the data set at hand. Section 5 introduces the empirical model. We discuss various count data approaches to the patent-R&D relationship and present some specification tests. In section 6 we present the regression estimates and take a closer look at the elasticity of patent applications to R&D. Finally, section 7 summarizes our results and draws some conclusions for further research.
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Patents, R&D and Innovation at the, Firm Level
Although patents and R&D are regularly used indicators of technical change at the macro and the micro level, only a few studies seek to analyze their relation at a micro level. R&D reflects the input side whereas patents can be viewed as a measure of an intermediate output of innovation processes. Both have their strengths and weaknesses which need not to be discussed in detail here. The main problems with patents arise from the fact that not all inventions will be patented. Imitative and incremental innovations are not covered by patent statistics although they represent a large and increasingly important part of innovation activities of firms. The most obvious short-coming of R&D statistics is their undercoverage of innovation activities in small firms (see e.g. Kleinknecht and Reijnen 1991) .' As recent research has shown small firms are less likely to be engaged in R&D; but if they have de~ided to do so, small firms invest more compared to their size than medium sized firms but less than large firms. 2
It is well known from patent application data that a large share of patents is applied for by only a small number of firms and that, therefore, the distribution patent application numbers is highly skewed. But it is less known about the distribution of patenting or not by firm size. Figure 1 contains the size distribution of innovating, R&D performing and patenting firms. As expected, the percentages of innovating, R&D performing and patenting firms increase strongly with firm size. Slightly more than 50% of all manufacturing companies with more than 4 and less than 50 employees have introduced improved or new products or processes in 1990-1992 or intended to do so in 1993-1995. 3 The share of R&D performing firms amounts to 20% of all firms in this size class. However, just one out of ten innovating firms applies for a patent in 1992 in the smallest size class. In the largest size class the percentage of patenting firms exceeds 65%. When looking at the innovative firm only, the figure demonstrates that the shares of non R&D performing and non patenting companies decline with firm size. Thus the innovation activities of small and medium companies will most certainly be underestimated if only R&D and patents are_used as indicators for innovative activities.
The difference between small and large firms is even more pronounced with respect to patent applications at more than one patent office in one year. The overwhelming majority of German patenting firms apply to the German patent office. Just around 10% of the patenting firms use the European procedure only and do not apply to the German office. The share of firms that do not only apply to the German or European patent office but also to the US Patent and Trademark Office or another patent office is increasing with firm size for small and medium sized firms. But this share is nearly constant for firms with more than 250 employees. 4 Since the application I Throughout the paper R&D always refers to the FRASCATI-definition (see OECD 1993) .
See e.g. Felder et al. (1996) who simultaneously model the decision to perform R&D and the R&D intensity. The V-shaped form of the relationship between R&D intensity and firm size depends strongly on the indicators used to measure R&D intensity.
cost at a foreign patent office are larger than a patent application at the home office, and exporting is more common in larger enterprises, this result is in line with our expectations. Our data produces two stylised facts already shown by Sirilli (1987) for the Italian manufacturing sector: the structure of international patenting activities is similar to the structure of international trade; abroad extension of patents is increasing with firm size. So, firm size and export status are expected to be important determinants of patent behaviour in foreign countries. . .~g 
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Innovation activities and patent applications in Germany Figure 2 documents some differences between non patenting firms, firms which apply for patents in Germany only as well as firms, which apply for patents at least to one foreign patent office. There are significant differences between patenting and non-patenting firms. But these differences are less significant between firms which only use GPO applications and firms which also apply to foreign patent offices (including EPa).
The first three items in Figure 2 relate to the sources of knowledge used to generate innovations. We distinguish (l) the firm's own R&D department, (2) scientific institutions and (3) other firms as being an important sources of know-how. s Own R&D seems to be an important source of know-how especally for patenting firms. A much larger share of patentors regard scientific institutions as an important source of knowledge for innovation processes. This difference is less pronounced with regard to private firms as sources of know-how. To fulfill the novelty requirements patenting firms show a more systematic, R&D based approach to knowledge generation than non patenting firms. These differences on the input side of innovation processes is also confirmed by differences with respect to the results of innovation processes. Figure 2 shows that a larger share of patenting firms introduced products which are not only new to the firm but represent market innovations. When we look at the share of sales of innovative products 6 , we find no difference between patenting and non patenting firms. So, market success with innovative products not only depends on successful technological solutions which are represented by a patent, but _also on complementary assets and activities of firms (e.g. superior sales effort).7 In addition, Figure 2 shows that a lot of firms (40%) introduce products 'new to the industry' without applying for patent protection. One of the most prominent explanations maintains that patents are an imperfect tool for protecting innovations. Alternatively, market novelties do not always meet the novelty requirements of patents. '
Furthermore, patenting firms spend a larger share of the total R&D budget than non patenting firms on product innovation. Those in tum spend a larger share on process R&D. But this does not imply that patentors devote a higher share of their total innovative activities to new products compared to non patenting companies. Cost saving process innovations and the generation and market introduction of product innovations are viewed as equally important by patenting and non-patenting firms. Figure 2 also shows that patents are an important tool in the strategy of firms. This notion rests on the result that exporting companies and companies with innovative activities devoted to foreign markets, are involved in patenting to a larger extent. This is even true when we look at patenting only in Germany. So, patenting seems to be especially important in markets which are open to international competition.
5
'Scientific institutions' and 'other private firms' are 'aggregated' representations of various sources of information (e.g. customers, suppliers, competitors, consultants, universities, government research laboratories). Firms rate the importance of these source for innovation on a five-point scale.
The aggregate values are the weighted sum of the scores given to these sources. Weights are obtained by a factor analysis (see Felder et al. 1996 for details).
6
'Innovative products' refer to products introduced to the market in the last three years. Innovative products are defined as 'new to the firm'. Therefore, this figure also includes the market success with pure imitative products.
Protecting the home market by patents is only the first step in gaining intellectual property rights for new products at the world market.
A Theoretical Framework for the Econometric Analysis of Patent Applications
A firm will apply for patent protection if the expected marginal return of protection exceeds the cost of an application. The returns from using the patent system depend on whether patents are effective in preventing imitation by competitors. In addition, if competitors profit from the knowledge diffused through publication of patents returns are also adversely affected. Recently, Cohen et al. (1996) provide some evidence that patents are a rather imperfect shelter from imitation. As the theoretical models of Horstman et al. (1985) and Harter (1993) show, firms will not always apply for a patent if patents diffuse information to competitors. In order to protect its competitive edge, a firm may apply for patent protection for only some fraction of its inventions. Indeed, many firms may not rely on patents at all but on alternative mechanisms like secrecy or complexity of product design. Both arguments lead to the concept of the propensity to patent which states that firms patent only a fraction of their inventions. This is captured by the equation
where P ij rs--the number of patent applications of firm i at the patent office j. The vector Xi captures characteristics of firms which affect the difference between the marginal expected return from using patents and the costs for applying and holding of a patent. Ii is the number of inventions of firm i which fulfill the novelty test.
The function g represents the propensity to patent and depends on the characteristics of the patent system. The model of Horstman et al. (1985) implies gj to be smaller than unity. In addition, as the application for patents at a foreign patent office is more expensive than an application at the home office we also suppose that on average foreign patents should be more valuable than patent application in the home country. So, the expected value of the least valuable patent applied for at a foreign office should exceed the least valuable patent at the home office. Therefore, we should keep in mind that patent applications at foreign offices may be more homogenous W.r.t. to their value than patents applied for at the home patent office. Equation (I) can not be implemented directly as we do not observe the number of inventions at the firm level. But inventions can be viewed as the outcome of a systematic search process for novelties. The relationship between the outcome of innovative activities and the inputs can be represented by the concept of a production function for inventions. This analytical tool is thought to describe the transformation of R&D into new knowledge which in later stages of the innovation process is used for the development of new products and processes. We assume R&D to be the most important input into the knowledge generating process. In addition, firms profit from other firms' R&D. So, the larger this spillover is the larger will be the productivity of a firm to generate inventions. To capture this, we assume that R&D capital of the industry enhance the knowledge generating process of firms. Therefore, a simple version of the invention production function is given by where Ii represents the number of inventions made by firm i in the period under consideration. Kj denotes the firm's own R&D capital and K s indicates the R&D capital of all other firms (= the industry) from which knowledge spillovers arise. Ai represents other firm-specific factors which influence the R&D productivity of a firm in generating inventions. This factors are referred to as technological opportunities in the literature.
Combining (l) and (2) we derive an equation which relates the number of patents to R&D and various factors which influence the propensity to patent.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that gj and f are exponential functions of a linear combination of their arguments. Therefore, the log of the number of patents is modelled as a linear function of the arguments of g and f.
Given the nature of invention, a random error uncorrelated with the arguments of g and f is added to the loglinear version of equation (3). This random error should also account for unobserved heterogeneity due to the economic value of an invention. As firms probably differ in their ability to assess a priori the economic value of an invention and hence of a patent,8 their propensity to patent might be affected by this unobserved ability.
Equation (3) relates the number of patent applications to R&D in a rather simple manner but also shows that there probably is a number of other variables intervening into the relationship between R&D and patents. Spillovers have an ambigious effect on the number of patents. On the one hand spillovers will enhance the productivity of R&D and increase the number of inventions. On the other hand spillovers probably reduce the propensity to patent and induce firms to rely on alternative mechanisms to protect the' competitive edge. In addition, if patents induce an overinvestment in R&D it can occure that we observe a negative correlation between industry's R&D and the number of patents.
Empirical Implementation
Our data set contains information on the number of patent applications at the German, the European and US Patent Office by German firms in 1992. Unfortunately, we do not observe whether this patent applications refer to the same invention, d.i. belonging to the same patent family. Moreover, given the rules of international patenting, it seems not reasonable to assume that this is the case. Extentions of patent applications at the home office to foreign patent systems usually do not occur within the same year.
We are restricted to a single cross-section of data which implies that the cost of patent applications does not vary very much in the sample used. Variation in application costs is mainly present between offices. E.g. it is well-known that patent applications at the European patent office are far more expensive than patent applications at the German office. So, we should expect that firms apply for patent protection for some of the less valuable inventions at the German patent office but hesitate to apply for this invention at the EPO or foreign patent offices. Therefore, patent applications at foreign patent offices are expected to have a large mean economic value when compared to the patent application at the home patent office. So, differences in application costs and the value of patents are given only implicitly as our data set contains patent applications at different patent offices. We should keep this in mind when we interpret the estimation results.
The implementation of various exogenous variables also need some further comments. 9 Since our data set does not contain any information on past R&D expenditure which would allow the construction of firm specific R&D capital stocks, we use the current R&D expenditures as a proxy for the R&D capital stock. But our data allow us to identify whether a firm performs R&D on a continuous basis. This information can be used to account for past R&D, which has a longlasting effect on the productivity in generating patents.
The construction of the spillover pool is also restricted by data availability. Since no information is available on the technological field (e.g. Jaffe 1988) or the product groups (e.g. Harhoff 1994 ) in which firms perform R&D, we use the total R&D expenditures of an industry as reported in the official 1992 German R&D statistics (see SV-Wissenschaftsstatistik 1994) . In addition, we account for firm specific differences in the invention production function. Following Levin and Reiss (1987) we assume that the productivity is higher because of higher technological opportunities if firms view scientific sources as an important source of information for their innovation activities. Zimmermann und Schwalbach (1991) show that the number of patents strictiy increases with firm size. In addition, it is often argued that small firms hesitate to apply for a patent because of the large patent litigation costs. We test for the effect of firm size on the propensity to patent by including the logarithm of the number of employees.
Several studies argue that the degree of diversification has an impact on the propensity to patent (see e.g. Zimmermann and Schwalbach 1991) . The reason for this behaviour is that more diversified firms may use an invention in different products and processes. So the market risk of innovation is lower and the expected marginal returns from patenting are higher.
We consider the impact of the export status of a firm on the propensity to patent. A positive impact of exports on the propensity to patent is expected as the number of competitors gets larger for exporting firms and, therefore, protection of knowledge is more important.
Due to the transformation process in East-Germany, the productivity in generating patents as well as the propensity to patent are likely lower among East-German than among West-German companies. This is most obvious from the fact that within a few years, the number of R&D personnel drops from 88 000 (1989) to around 22000 (1993) . This drop is accompanied by reorganisations of R&D departments. In addition, new R&D projects are started recently have less in common with R&D programmes of the former GDR enterprises which were to a large extent imitation of Western technologies. Therefore, a dummy for East-German firms is included.
Finally, the propensity to patent as well as the patent productivity are affected by other firm characteristics. In some firm groups only the mother company applies for the patent regardless of the subsidiary brought forth the invention. This is especially well known from foreign companies. On the other hand daughter companies might profit from R&D performed in other parts of the group which would imply a higher productivity of the observed unit. Therefore, we use dummies for firms which are part of the group and for firms with a foreign mother company.
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Econometric Modelling
The number of patents is restricted by definition to non-negative integers. Appropriate estImation techniques for this kind of data are given by the family of count data models. Count data models are applied to the patents-R&D relationship by a number of researchers including Bound et al. (1984) as well as Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) for the US, Crepon and Duguet (1993) for France or Zimmermann and Schwalbach (1991) for Germany. Our econometric modelling strategy starts with some basic models for count data which we describe briefly in the first part of the chapter. The second part of this chapter deals with hurdle models for count data. IO the economic rationale for applying hurdle models rest on the plausible assumption that the decision to apply for the first patent and the decision to apply for additional patents are ruled by different processes. The decision to apply for a patent has to be made when the yield of holding this patent is not known exactly. Firms often adopt some basic decisions how to protect intellectual property and how to handle patentable inventions. This basic decision is often made in the context of the first invention. The decision to apply for patents for additional inventions is often based on this first principle decision. So, we should expect different rules which govern the decision concerning for the first patent and for additional patents. The empirical specification of the model should take potentially different decision processes into account. Clearly. all firms included in our sample are assumed to decide whether to patent their innovations or not. Therefore, we restrict the sample to those firms which actuall y introduced a product or a process innovation in recent years 
_Hurdle models for Count Data
A further alternative modelling strategy in the light of overdispersion is to assume that the decisions of whether or not to patent and to apply for more than one patent are ruled by different processes. This can be done using hurdle models for 'count data proposed by Mullahy (1986) . The hurdle model takes account of the fact that there may be different distributions which govern the first decision to patent an invention and the decision to apply for patent protection for other inventions. In a more technical view, the hurdle specification rests on the assumption that the data generating process is driven by two sets of parameters. The underlying idea is that a binomial probability model governs the binary outcome of whether a count variate has a zero or a positive realisation (Mullahy 1986) . Once the hurdle is crossed and positive counts are observed, the data generating process is governed by a truncated-at-zero count model. The binomial process in the first stage can also be interpreted as a threshold-~rossing binary choice model, in which the continuous latent variable is the firm's propensity to enter the second stage of the process, i.e. the firm's willingness to patent an invention (see Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995) .
Assume that II is any probability distribution function for non-negative integers, that governs the decision whether or not to patent, and that 12 represents the process governing the decision once the hurdle is crossed. Then the probability distribution of the model is given by:
( 1-11 (0») gives the probability of crossing the hurdle and (1-12 (0») is the normalisation for 12 (y) because of the truncation at zero (see Winkelmann and Zimmermann 1995) .
The likelihood of the model depends on two different parameter vectors: f3 I represents the parameters w.r.t. the decision for the first patent, f3 2 captures the parameter vector which refers to the decision to apply for more than one patent. Let no denote the subsample of firms without a patent application and Q 1 represents the subsample of firms with at least one patent application. Then we can write the likelihood as follows: (7) The likelihood for the binary process to patent or not to patent is given by the first two expressions (7), and the last part is the likelihood of a truncated-at-zero count model.
We chose negbin II as the underlying distribution for both stages for the following reasons: It captures unobserved heterogeneity, allows for overdispersion in its own right and enables us to test the distributional assumptions. In addition, we estimate the poisson hurdle model proposed by Mullahy (1986) , where we assume that the underlying distribution for both stages is poisson. Finally, we also consider a poisson-negbin hurdle model which assumes the poisson distribution for the first stage and the negbin II distribution for the second stage. Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995) . Hence, it is quite easy to test the various models against each other. More details can be found in Appendix 3.
As stands out from Appendix 3, our test strategy implies that a negbin hurdle model is preferable. Moreover, this conclusion is confirmed by comparing the observed number of firms with a cert,ain number of patents and the predicted number of firms with a given number of patent applications. These predictions are obtained by first calculating for each observation, the probability for a certain number of patents and then by summing over these individual predicted probabilities for each category (see Winkelmann and Zimmermann 1995) . The predicted and observed number of firms within each category (number of patents) are compared in Figure 3 , details are reported in the Appendix 4. We will thus report only the results from the negbin hurdle model, noting that the results for the alternative poisson negbin hurdle model are rather similar.
Regression Results
Regression results for the model outlined in equation (7) are reported in Table 2 . 13 The model is estimated separately for patent applications at the German, the European and the US patent office. Overall, we find remarkable differences between patent applications at the German Patent Office, the European Patent Office, and the US Patent and Trademark Office. In our opinion this partly reflects peculiarities of the patent procedures of these three offices and can be attributted to the smaller heterogeneity of patents in terms of their value in the case of the EPO and USPTO.
But the results demonstrate that the patent strategies of firms are important determinants of patent activities and, therefore, the number of patents produced by an economy in a given year not only reflects technological success but also depends on behavioural patterns of firms. The number of patents of a firm rests not only on the productivity in generating invention but also on their propensity to patent. This can be seen in the differences of estimated parameter vector for the decision stage and the number of patent part of the hurdle models. Different parameter vectors for both stages are evident from the specification tests reported in Appendix 3.
In addition, the propensity to patent not only affects the decision whether to patent or not, but also affects the number of patents. This is evident from the fact that export share and firm size which were expected to be arguments of the propensity to patent part of the model, are also significant in the second stage. This interpretation is also confirmed by the parameter estimates for the diversification indicator: the higher the degree of diversification the lower will be the number of patents applied for. But the principal decision on whether or not to patent is unaffect by diversification. A possible interpretation of this result could be that diversified firms spend a larger share'of their R&D on incremental, non-patentable innovations, so that their 'productivity' in generating patents is lower.
R&D turns out to be a major source in generating new knowledge. The elasticity of the number of patents with respect to R&D is increasing with current R&D expenditures as it is indicated by the coefficients of log R&D (LR&D) and its square (LR&DSQ) in the patent numbers part of the model. Our results, therefore, suggest economies of. scale with respect to the production of patents. Figure 4 shows the_elasticities of the number of patents applied for with respect to R&D. The elasticities are increasing throughout the relevant range of R&D expenditures.
Besides the R&D elasticity of patent numbers, Figure 4 indicates the median value of firms R&D expenditure for those firms which apply to the three patent offices. These calculations show that for the median R&D performer the elasticity is rather close to one. Only for some large R&D spenders, economies to scale are sufficiently large. So, for the majority of firms our results do not deviate too much from recent results for France by Crepon and Duguet (1996) who find an elasticity of patent W.r.t. R&D not deviating significantly from unity.
Moreover, different fixed costs seem to be associated with patent applications at the GPO, the EPO and the USPTO. The parameter estimates for R&D in the hurdle stage is much lower for the GPO than for the EPO and the USPTO. The parameter estimates for the second stage of the hurdle model are far less different between these different kinds of patent applications. . . .
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Remark: Calculations are based on regression estimates reported in Table 2 . We use the estimates of the 'numbers part' only. The value of the spillover-effect is evaluated at the median value for the GPO.
The evidence for positive knowledge spillovers from other firms R&D investment seems rather weak in our data. No significant impact of the spillover pool (SPILL) on patent activity is observed. Moreover, as the interaction term between own R&D and the spillover pool (R&D_SPILL) is not significant, we conclude that even in high-tech sectors the patent productivity is not affected by spillovers or patent rivalry effects. So, our results do not confirm Crepon and Duguet (1996) who find negative rivalry effects with regard to the number of patents of French companies. They also point out that this effect is especially important for big companies. As many small and medium firms are included in our data set this can be an explanation for this different results.
Technological opportunity should reflect interfirm differences in R&D productivity: Those firms which regard scientific institutions as primary sources of information for their innovation activities (SCIENCE) apply more often for patents. This reveals that the productivity of R&D is larger in technological areas where the know-how generating process within the firms is enhanced by ongoing research in public scientific infrastructure.
Export activities seem to be one of the major determinants of a firm's propensity to patent. Even in the case of applications at the GPO, the number of patent applications increases with the export share. As one would expect, the effect of exports increases when looking at the EPa and even more when looking at the USPTO. This is even more pronounced if innovation activities are undertaken to protect future competitiveness in foreign markets.
Firm size exhibits a large effect on patenting. The propensity to patent seems to increase with firm size. Even more surprising is the large firm size effect found in the patent numbers part of our model. This can be interpreted towards a higher productivity in generating invention in large firms. An alternative explanation could be that rules, adopted in larger firms, stimulate patent applications even if the economic value of an invention is probably low. 14 Moreover, larger firms are probably more aware of the role played by patents in cross-licensing agreements, R&D cooperations and the strategic dimension of patents. Legal regulations like the German Employee Inventor Law ("Arbeitnehmererfindergesetz") also stimulate to patent applications. Those rules are probably more important considerations for the formalised innovation processes of large companies and, therefore, in line with the increasing propensity to patent in large companies.
We should also note that despite of a large correlation of firm size and R&D in a cross-section regression, the coefficients on the R&D variables only slightly change when we drop firm size from our regression.
Other firm characteristics included in the model are some what surprising. We do not find a significant negative effect neither for small nor for large East-German firms. Only in the hurdle stage in the regression model for the German patent office the East-German dummy variable neady reaches statistically significance. So, our model do not point to a lower patent productivity nor to a different behaviour towards patents in East-German firms. The small patent numbers of the EastGerman economy are mainly caused by a low R&D effort and the small number of large firms in East-Germany.
In addition, our expectations with regard to a lower patent activity of group members and subsidiaries of foreign firms are not fulfilled by our results. Given the large differences in the way multinational companies organize their decision processes a more refined modelling seems to be necessary before we can reach more clear-cut conclusions with regard to the patent behaviour of the German daughters of multinational companies.
Finally, our specification also includes 12 sector dummies. We omit the discussion of these dummies because it is difficult to interpret whether they reflect interfirm differences in the propensity to patent or in the invention production function.
7 Summary and some hints on further research
Based on the data of the first wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel, this paper explores the role of patents as appropriability mechanisms and the relation between R&D expenditures and patents. This data generates the possibility to look at the firm size distribution of patents application at different patent offices.
Before summarizing the main results, some qualifying remarks are in order. First, as it is shown by various other studies (see e.g. Harhoff 1994 for German manufacturing) spillovers and appropriability conditions depend crucially on the nature of technology. Further research should more explicitly explore the possibility to estimate our model for high-tech and low-tech sectors separately. Secondly, we neglect technology-specific effects. These effects can be accounted when using the information on technology inherent in the classification of patents by patent office. Therefore, we should seek to explicitly merge available patent application data at the level of patents to our firm level data set (see e.g. Jaffe 1989 ). Finally, R&D expenditures and patent applications are maybe determined simultaneously (see Pakes 1985) . Future research should try to take this simultaneity into account and test whether the results of this paper suffer from a simultaneous equation bias.
The results of the paper can be summarized in the following way: In the first part of the paper it is shown that the share of R&D performing firms strictly increases with firm size. The share of firms applying for patents exhibits an even steeper increase with firm size. Moreover, the larger a firm, the more likely it is to apply for patents in more than one country. Although large firms apply for a German patent with a higher probability than SMEs, large firms also apply to the European patent office whereas SMEs often apply for a patent at the German patent office only. The German patent office seems to be especially important for small firms.
The second part of the paper explores the relationship between R&D and patents more closely. We find a close relationship between R&D and patents. Our hurdle negbin regression model implies the presence of economies of scale in the patents-R&D relationship. But the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D significantly exceeds unity only for large R&D spenders. For the majority of firms this elasticity is just around 1. Using the R&D expenditures of the industry, our model is thought to capture spillovers or effects of R&D rivalry on the number of patents. But we failed to find empirical evidence for these effects.
Even after controlling for a variety of firm characteristics, firm size exhibits a large effect on the propensity to patent. Patents also play an important role when looking at export strategies of firms. Exporting firms apply more often for patents at the German patent office and even more at foreign patent offices. Therefore, we should be very careful when using patent numbers as an indicator of the technological capabilities of firms or economies as strategic decisions are important determinants 21 of the number of patent applications. So, a change in the number of patents applications of an economy in a given year can well be the result of a change in the patent strategy of firms and need not to be the result of an increase in the technological capabilities of the economy.
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size for Data Used in Regression Analysis -Unweighted Data
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Appendix 3: Model Selection and Testing the Distributional Assumptions For Count Data Models
Count data models assume a dependent variable resulting from an underlying discrete probability function. The econometric toolbox offers a wide range of possible distributional assumptions. This appendix describes our procedure to test these distribution~l assumptions and to select the most appropriate empirical specification. We restrict ourselves to the poisson distribution and compounds of the poisson distribution. The results are summarized in Figure A 1 Chernoff (1954) shows that under the null hypothesis the likelihood-ratio statistic for testing a = 0 is similar to a random "Variable which has a probability mass of 0.5 at zero and a 0,5XL(l) distribution for positive values (see Lawless 1987, Winkelmann and Zimmermann 1995) . We used this property to test the negbin models (I and IT) against the poisson model. This idea is also applied to test the poisson-negbin hurdle model against the poisson hurdle specification and also to test the negbin hurdle specification against the poisson-negbin hurdle specification.
If the models at hand are not nested we apply a likelihood ratio based test for strictly non-nested models proposed by Vuong (1989) . Using the Kullback Leibler Information Criterion to measure the closeness of a model to the truth, Vuong devices a likelihood-ratio based statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the competing models are equally close to the true data generating process against the alternative hypothesis that one model is closer.
We start with testing the basic models discussed in Chapter 5. First, we test the poisson model which implies the equality of conditional mean and conditional variance of the distribution of the dependent variable. In most applications the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean which is known as overdispersion. We test for overdispersion using regression-based tests of Cameron and Trivedi (1990) . This is done with the help of a standard t-test from an auxilliary regression which is asymmtotically equivalent to their optimal test. 17 This test is computed from an OLS regression of (..J2A..,)-I[(Y,-A.. j These test results let us search for more general models allowing for overdispersion. A first alternative are models assuming a negative binomial distribution for the data generating process. We estimate both models negbin I and negbin IT, which imply different forms of heteroscedasticity.
Since it is difficult to tell a priori which of the two models is more appropriate for the data set at hand, we test which one performs better. The two versions of the negbin model are not nested. Therefore, we apply the test proposed by Vuong (1989) . This test is directional: Large positive tvalues favour negbin I model, large negative values of the t-statistic favour the negbin IT model, insignificant t-values in the usual sense mean that one cannot discriminate between the two models. As indicated by insignificant t-statistics in all three cases, we cannot reject the null of no difference between the two models negbin I or negbin II.
Figure At: Testing distributional assumptions for various count data models
We also apply the Vuong-test to decide between poisson hurdle and negbin II model, since these are not nested. Here large positive t-values favour the poisson hurdle model, large negative values of the t-statistic favour the negbin II model. The results show that negbin II is better than poisson hurdle. Since both specification allow for overdispersion this result justifies the assumption that unobserved heterogenity should be accounted for. _ As shown by Mullahy (1986) and Winkelmann (1994) Hausman test could not be applied due to the fact that the difference of the covariance-matrices used to compute the statistic failed to be a positive definite matrix.
As obvious from Figure A4 the test strategy implies that a negbin hurdle model is preferable. With respect to the poisson-negbin hurdle model only, the Hausman test and the LR-test do not point in the same direction. Moreover, this conclusion is confirmed by comparing the observed number of firms with a certain number of patents and the predicted number of firms with a given number of patent applications (see Appendix 4). The prediction of count data models are obtained by first calculating for each observation the probability for a certain number of patents and then sum over these individual predicted probabilities for each category (see Winkelmann and Zimmermann 1995) . The predicted and observed number of firms within each category (number of patents) are compared in Figure 3 , details are reported in the appendix 4. 
